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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—“HAD  ANYTHING  BEEN  WRONG, 
WE SHOULD CERTAINLY HAVE HEARD”1: THE ANONYMOUS JURY 
IN AMERICA 
INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of June 30, 2003, Trovon Ross knocked on the 
door of Annie Christensen, his ex-girlfriend.2  Annie answered the 
door and let Trovon into the front room.3  Annie then called James 
May, her current boyfriend, from the bedroom.4  Trovon ques­
tioned Annie about James.5  When Annie was unresponsive, 
Trovon pulled a gun from his waistband and put the questions to 
her again.6  Annie asked the distraught Trovon to leave.  But 
Trovon was not finished.7  He turned his inquiry to James, who was 
equally unresponsive.8 
There are four things that will make any one of us step over the 
line: love, fear, ambition, and money.9  That morning, love got the 
best of Trovon Ross.  He grabbed Annie, pointed the gun at her, 
and pushed her into the bedroom.10 
James feared the worst and tried to intervene.  He warned 
Trovon that if he went missing the Air Force would come looking 
for him.11  Seeing that Trovon was unmoved by this appeal, James 
fled.  He ran to the garage and got into his car.12  From inside the 
house he heard three gunshots.13  He tried to start his car but could 
not without blowing into a breathalyzer ignition interlock device, 
and his breathing was too panicked for the device to work.14 
1. W.H. AUDEN, The Unknown Citizen (To JS/07/M/378 This Marble Monument 
is Erected by the State), in COLLECTED  POEMS 252 (Edward Mendelson ed., Vintage 
Int’l 1991) (1939). 
2. State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628, 630 (Utah 2007). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING’S MEN 205 (1946). 
10. Ross, 174 P.3d at 630. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
215 
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Moments later, Trovon entered the garage.15  James threw the 
keys out of the car and ran down the street on foot.16  He did not 
make it very far before Trovon fired six shots at him.17  The second 
of these went through his right arm and into his chest.18  A passing 
motorist stopped to help James and phoned the police.19  By this 
time, several neighbors had also called the police and directed the 
officers to Trovon’s white van.20  Several police cars attempted to 
stop the van, but Trovon would not pull over.21  Finally, he was cor­
nered in a cul-de-sac.22  A brief foot chase followed, but the officers 
arrested him at last.23 
In November 2004, the State of Utah tried Trovon for the ag­
gravated murder of Annie Christensen, the attempted aggravated 
murder of James May, and failure to obey a police officer’s signal to 
stop.24  The trial judge, concerned about publicity and media atten­
tion surrounding the case, empaneled an anonymous jury “to pro­
tect the identity and privacy of the jurors[ ] and to protect jurors, 
witnesses, and parties from unnecessary commotion, confusion, or 
influence.”25  Thus protected, the jury convicted Trovon on all 
charges.26  The judge sentenced him to three concurrent prison 
terms–life without parole, five years to life, and zero to five years.27 
This Note will examine the Ross court’s application of estab­
lished anonymous jury jurisprudence.  Empaneling an anonymous 
jury is an extreme but sometimes necessary step that courts must 
take during the criminal trials of certain defendants.28  When the 
established guidelines for empanelment are properly applied, 
judges can protect the jury’s essential elements from the potentially 
devastating influence of defendant misconduct and the disruption 
of procedure that attends extraordinary media coverage.  But if 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 631. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Gambino, 809 F. Supp. 1061, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); State v. Ferguson, 729 
N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
217 
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there is no defendant misconduct, or if the only threat to procedure 
is from the media, empaneling an anonymous jury is unwarranted, 
beyond the scope of the judge’s discretion, and is itself an impair­
ment of the jury’s essential elements. 
The first section of this Note will review the history of the jury 
in England and its adoption by the American colonies.  The pur­
pose of this review is to provide a context and background for mod­
ern Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and for Justice White’s 
important articulation of the jury’s essential elements in Williams v. 
Florida.29  This section will then consider the use of anonymous ju­
ries in federal district courts and their introduction and use in state 
courts.  Two lines of cases will be considered: the Barnes-Paccione30 
line of cases, which established the circumstances under which an 
anonymous jury may be empaneled, and the Press-Enterprise31 
cases, which outlined the relationship between the constitutional re­
quirement for a public trial in the Sixth Amendment and the right 
of the press and public to open access at trial in the First 
Amendment.32 
The second section will consider how the anonymous jury doc­
trine fits into established Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  This 
analysis will specifically suggest that the guidelines for empaneling 
anonymous juries, as established in the Barnes-Paccione line of 
cases, achieve legitimacy by securing the essential elements of the 
jury articulated in Williams v. Florida.33  But because the Barnes-
Paccione guidelines protect different aspects of these interests in 
very particular ways, courts cannot haphazardly apply them.  A 
unique calculus ought to be considered when circumstances of the 
trial do not meet all of the guidelines.  The last part of this section 
will argue that the Ross case, in which only two of the five guide­
lines were met, is a startling example of miscalculation in applying 
the Barnes-Paccione guidelines.  This Note will conclude with the 
suggestion that state courts should be more rigid in their application 
of these factors when the temptation to empanel an anonymous 
jury arises. 
29. 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970). 
30. Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192; United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 134-43 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
31. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7-14 (1986) (Press-Enter­
prise II); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510-13 (1984) (Press-
Enterprise I). 
32. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7. 
33. Williams, 399 U.S. at 86-103. 
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I. HISTORY OF THE JURY 
A. The Significance of the Jury 
A jury, in simple terms, is a group of people “taken from the 
community at large, summoned to find the truth of disputed facts, 
who are quite distinct from the judges or court.”34  Juries serve on 
particular occasions and then recede back into the community once 
their task is complete.35  Given the jury’s transient and temporary 
nature and the fact that it is composed of twelve people of average 
intelligence, the marvel of the system is that the technicality and 
complexity of the law, however great, will “not affect [the jury’s] 
fitness to decide on the effect of proofs.”36 
But the jury is more than a utilitarian marvel.  It is as well a 
political institution, one that is “as extreme a consequence of the 
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.”37 
“It is to trial by jury,” according to Lord Russell, “more than even 
by representation . . . that the people own the share they have in the 
government of the country.”38  Alexis de Tocqueville celebrated the 
Anglo-American jury as “[a] judicial institution which has thus 
commanded the approval of a great nation over centuries and has 
been copied enthusiastically in every stage of civilization, in every 
climate and under every form of government.”39  From its mysteri­
ous beginnings, the jury earned its legitimacy not as an efficient de­
cision maker but as a protector of individual rights. 
B. The Development of the Jury in England 
The jury as we know it seems to have had its beginnings as an 
innovation of Henry II.40  Henry consolidated the English legal sys­
34. WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 7 (Lawbook Exchange 1994) 
(1894). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 9. 
37. ALEXIS DE  TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN  AMERICA 317, 318 (Gerald E. 
Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003) (1835). 
38. FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 358 (quoting JOHN RUSSELL, AN ESSAY ON THE R 
HISTORY OF THE  ENGLISH  GOVERNMENT AND  CONSTITUTION, FROM THE  REIGN OF 
HENRY VII, TO THE  PRESENT  TIME 199 (1821), available at http://www.archive.org/ 
stream/essayonhistoryof00russ/essayonhistoryof00russ_djvu.txt). 
39. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 317. R 
40. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW & REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WEST­
ERN LEGAL TRADITION 448 (1983); see THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORD­
ING TO  CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE  ENGLISH  CRIMINAL  TRIAL  JURY 1200­
1800, at 9-13 (1985). 
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tem by imposing royal law upon all criminal and civil matters.41 
Specifically, he combined the inquest by witness with the issuance 
of judicial writs.42  Writs, in Henry’s time, were royal commands 
ordering a lord to settle a land dispute or ordering the sheriff to 
convene the hundred.43  Henry’s writs set forth a narrow factual 
test, put the questions of fact before a sworn inquest of neighbors, 
and established royal jurisdiction over the proceedings.44  The con­
solidation succeeded because it provided “a more rational type of 
law and . . . enlist[ed] community participation in administering 
it.”45  But it would be a mistake to suppose that the communal na­
ture of Henry’s innovation had to do with anything except calcu­
lated Norman efficiency; Henry’s object was “to compel people to 
inform on one another.”46  Despite the king’s tyrannical motive, 
community participation almost certainly lent a popular legitimacy 
to the enterprise.47  And circumstances were such that jurors and 
the accused were known to one another.48  The persistence of these 
inquests into modern times is a testament to their popular appeal, 
for these panels were essentially the forerunners of grand juries.49 
Along with trial by ordeal in 1215, the other ancient methods 
of trial—battle and compurgation—eventually fell off.50  In their 
41. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 445-46. R 
42. Id. at 448. 
43. Id. at 447.  The “hundred” is an administrative division of an English county. 
BLACK’S  LAW  DICTIONARY 809 (9th ed. 2009).  Hundreds, in former times, had their 
own courts. Id. 
44. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 448; GREEN, supra note 40, at 10. R 
45. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 445-46; see also GREEN, supra note 40, at 10. R 
46. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 451. R 
47. See GREEN, supra note 40, at 20 (“The power of the jury may have reflected R 
more than its institutional setting and role: it may have reflected a social understanding 
about the appropriate circumstances under which a person’s life might be surrendered 
to the Crown.”). 
48. See FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 165-66; GREEN, supra note 40, at 10. R 
49. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 451; NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERI- R 
CAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 24 (2007).  Panels of this sort were not Henry’s innovation. 
BERMAN, supra note 40, at 448.  Rather, Henry made these panels arms of the king’s R 
administration. Id. 
50. FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 165.  There were four methods of proof used to R 
settle disputes in England prior to the jury trial: “trial by wager of battle, trial by ordeal, 
compurgation, and trial by witnesses.” VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 21.  In the R 
trial by battle, the parties would swear to their version of the facts, and each would offer 
to prove his side by battle or by hiring a champion to do battle for him. MAXIMUS 
LESSER, HISTORY OF THE JURY SYSTEM 91 (William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1894).  The 
loser would be severely punished for swearing falsely. Id.  Trial by ordeal was also 
called judicium dei, a procedure that overlapped with religious ritual. See id. at 81; 
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 22.  There were various methods of ordeal.  The R 
accused, for example, might be bound hand and foot and thrown in a lake. Id.  If she 
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place arose a tribunal similar to the inquest that had brought the 
accusation.51  This new panel retained the neighbors, who likely 
knew all the circumstances of the case.52  By the reign of Edward 
III (1327), the jury that indicted and the jury that tried facts were 
two separate bodies.53  The idea behind the separation seems to 
have been to afford the accused a fair outcome.54  As the trial by 
ordeal fell away, there was no other supernatural test to which the 
accused could appeal.55  The judges maintained the fiction that the 
accused must therefore “choose” to accept the verdict of his neigh­
bors.56  The second jury, different from the one that indicted, made 
the trial fairer and so encouraged the defendant’s consent.57  A fa­
miliar form of the jury system was thus in place by the middle of the 
fourteenth century.58 
sank, she was innocent; if she floated, she was guilty. Id.  Floaters were retrieved from 
the lake and branded or executed. Id.  Alternatively, she might be made to carry a hot 
iron so many feet. Id.  The blister was then examined after several days.  A clean blister 
meant innocence—a festering one guilt. Id.  By 1215, Pope Innocent III had seen 
enough. Id. at 23.  The Fourth Lateran Council forbade priests from participating in the 
ordeal, and it soon fell away in England. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 251; VIDMAR & R 
HANS, supra note 49, at 23.  Compurgation was “essentially a test of good character.” R 
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 23.  This method of proof required the accused to R 
round up a certain number of people (usually twelve) to swear regarding her good 
character.  Finally, trial by witnesses was similar to compurgation except that the wit­
nesses testified to facts rather than to character. BERMAN, supra note 40, at 448; VID- R 
MAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 23. R 
51. See generally FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 165-72. R 
52. Id. at 172. 
53. Id. at 170.  A statute of the time declared: “[N]o indictor shall be put in in­
quests upon deliverance of the indictees of felonies or trespass, if he be challenged for 
such cause by him who is indicted.” Id. (quoting 25 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.)). 
54. See FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF EN­
GLISH LEGAL HISTORY 59-60 (James F. Colby ed., 1915). 
55. Id. at 59. 
56. Id.  The notion of a choice is illusory, but it demonstrates certain niceties of 
the medieval mind that, were it not for the often tragic results, would be almost comical. 
Trial by ordeal was understood to be an ancient privilege—the defendant’s opportunity 
to invoke the judgment of God. Id. at 60.  But even after the trial by ordeal was no 
longer available, the notion persisted that the accused did not have to submit to a trial 
by mere men. Id. at 60-61.  Therefore, if the accused did not agree to a jury trial, he was 
subjected to the peine forte et dure. Id. at 60.  By this innovation, the accused was laid 
out naked on the dungeon floor, and heaping weights were placed upon him until he 
agreed to accept the verdict of his neighbors. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. FORSYTH, supra note 34, at 170; LESSER, supra note 50, at 148. R 
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Once the jury was established, king and subject alike recog­
nized its advantages and frequently exploited them.59  This reality 
was not lost on the Framers of the United States Constitution.60 
C. The Development of the Jury in America 
1. Colonial and Revolutionary Era Juries 
The jury system was present in the American Colonies long 
before the foundation of the United States.61  The colonists under­
stood and admired the principles of jury trial, and a fierce desire to 
protect rights established by this system lay at the very foundation 
of the United States.62  These sentiments can clearly be seen in the 
colonists’ response to England’s passage of the hated trade and rev­
enue laws in the 1760s and 1770s.63  A resolution of the Stamp Act 
Congress of 1765 proclaimed “[t]hat trial by jury is the inherent and 
invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.”64  En­
glish customs officials recognized that “provincial juries” would not 
cooperate in enforcing these regulations, and Parliament responded 
by giving jurisdiction over these cases to judges without juries.65 
Parliament’s interference with the colonists’ jury rights led to in­
creasing hostility against England.66  It is no surprise, therefore, 
that once the egg was hatched, the Declaration of Independence 
criticized George III for having “combined with others, to subject 
us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitutions, and unacknowl­
edged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Leg­
islation: . . . For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefit of Trial 
by Jury.”67 
The language of the Constitution likewise demonstrates that 
the Framers wished to preserve the jury as a fundamental institu­
59. See generally GREEN, supra note 40, at 28-64; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note R 
49, at 27-39. R 
60. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968); VIDMAR & HANS, 
supra note 49, at 47-54. R 
61. LESSER, supra note 50, at 151; see VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 47.  The R 
Virginia Company’s charter provided for jury trial in 1606; New Plymouth and the Mas­
sachusetts Bay Colony recognized trials by jury in 1623 and 1628 respectively; and jury 
trial was available in Rhode Island as early as 1647, prior to its formal establishment as 
a colony. Id. 
62. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 51, 52-54. R 
63. RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 24 (2003). 
64. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
65. JONAKAIT, supra note 63, at 24; VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 51-52. R 
66. JONAKAIT, supra note 63, at 24. R 
67. THE DECLARATION OF  INDEPENDENCE paras. 15, 20 (U.S. 1776); see also 
LESSER, supra note 50, at 151. R 
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tion of justice for the new nation.68  Article III declares that “[t]he 
Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.”69  Furthermore, such a trial 
must be “speedy and public,” and the jury both “impartial” and “of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed.”70 
But it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that the finer contours 
of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury were marked out by case 
law.  In these decisions, the Supreme Court questioned how much 
of the common-law jury the Founders wished to preserve in the text 
of Article III and the Sixth Amendment.71  These cases considered 
whether, for example, a jury’s verdict must be unanimous72 and 
whether a jury of less than twelve was constitutional.73  The Su­
preme Court addressed this last question in 1970 in Williams v. 
Florida.74 
In Williams, the Court reviewed the “very scanty history” of 
the provision for jury trials in Article III and the slightly less scanty 
history of the Sixth Amendment.75  During the drafting of the Bill 
of Rights, there was some concern that Article III had left out “the 
common-law right to be tried by a ‘jury of the vicinage.’”76  James 
Madison introduced a version of the Amendment in the House of 
Representatives that stated, “The trials of all crimes . . . shall be by 
an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of 
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amends. VI, VII. 
69. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
70. Id. amend. VI. 
71. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 
U.S. 404, 409-10 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970); Baldwin v. New 
York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968); Singer v. 
United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965). 
72. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 404. 
73. Williams, 399 U.S. at 86-103. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. at 93-94 (quoting Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal 
Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 969 
(1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  There is a great deal of scholarship ad­
dressing the broad historical question of how far the Founders wished to go (i.e., how 
radical or conservative they were) with respect to the Constitution and the English 
system of law they sought to overthrow.  For some interesting histories on this subject, 
see generally RICHARD  HOFSTEDLER, THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  TRADITION (1948); 
DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED (1989); GORDON S. WOOD, RADICALISM & 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991). All of these, to some extent, consider the general 
revolutionary pattern suggested by Mr. Berman. See BERMAN, supra note 40, at 19. R 
76. Williams, 399 U.S. at 93 (quoting F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 31-33, 
93 (1951)); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359 (“[B]y the policy of 
the ancient law, the jury was to come de vicineto, from the neighborhood of the vill or 
place where the cause of action was laid in the declaration.”). 
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unanimity for conviction, of the right to challenge, and other accus­
tomed requisites . . . .”77  This version passed the House with little 
change.78  But the Senate debated the matter for over a week and 
returned a significantly altered Amendment to the House.79  One of 
the main objections in the Senate was the vicinage requirement.80 
In many of the states, juries were selected from the state at large or 
from very large districts rather than from the counties.81  Enacting 
the vicinage requirement would have created administrative hard­
ships for those states that drew juries from large areas.82  The Sen­
ate also opposed the House’s version of the Amendment because 
the bill that would become the Judiciary Act of 1789 already in­
cluded a vicinage requirement.83 
Attempts at compromise were of little avail.  It was suggested 
that “with the accustomed requisites” be inserted after “Juries,” but 
even that was rejected.84  And so the Amendment took on its ulti­
mate form: “[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed . . . .”85 
In considering the Founders’ debate over the Sixth Amend­
ment, Justice White made three observations that establish a base­
line for analyzing the American jury in the context of constitutional 
history.86  First, “the mere reference to a ‘trial by jury’ in Article 
III” was not construed by the drafters of the Sixth Amendment to 
include the common-law vicinage requirement.87  If, therefore, the 
predicate of relation (i.e., to the area from which jurors are drawn) 
could be abandoned without violence to the Constitution, so too 
could the predicate of quantity.88  One can therefore infer that 
other predicates could be similarly abandoned without constitu­
tional effect.  Secondly, “provisions that would have explicitly tied 
77. Williams, 399 U.S. at 94 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789)). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 95. 
81. Id. at 95 n.39 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton 
(Sept. 14, 1789), in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITING OF JAMES MADISON 491 (1865)). 
82. Id. at 95 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra 
note 81) (internal quotation marks omitted). R 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 95-96. 
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
86. Williams, 399 U.S. at 96-97. 
87. Id. at 96. 
88. Recall that the issue in Williams was whether the defendant could be constitu­
tionally tried by a jury of less than twelve. Id. at 79. 
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the ‘jury’ concept to the ‘accustomed requisites [of common law ju­
ries]’ of the time were eliminated.”89  And thirdly, “where Congress 
wanted to leave no doubt that it was incorporating existing com­
mon-law features of the jury system, it knew how to use express 
language to that effect.”90  From these observations Justice White 
concluded, “[T]here is absolutely no indication in the ‘intent of the 
Framers’ of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and 
common-law characteristics of the jury.”91 
But the Court’s decision in Williams does not strip away the 
common-law protections that go beyond the letter of Article III and 
the Sixth Amendment.  The Court noted that 
[t]he purpose of the jury trial . . . is to prevent oppression by the 
Government. . . . Given this purpose, the essential feature of a 
jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and 
his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, 
and in the community participation and shared responsibility that 
results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence.92 
Thus, sometimes the Constitution demands more than the 
common-law jury provided for (for example, the requirement that a 
jury represent a fair cross section of the community),93 and other 
times less (for example, that a jury need not decide a case by unani­
mous vote).94  However, two “essential feature[s]” of the jury must 
remain: The jury must continue to interpose between the accused 
and his accuser “the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,” 
and the jury must reflect “the community participation and shared 
responsibility that results from [its] determination of guilt or inno­
cence.”95  Everything else appears to be fair game.  It can be ar­
gued, therefore, that Williams opened the door for federal district 
courts to empanel anonymous juries in the late 1970s. 
89. Id. at 96-97. 
90. Id. at 97. 
91. Id. at 99. 
92. Id. at 100. 
93. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1975). 
94. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972). 
95. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; see also ALFREDO  GARCIA, THE  SIXTH  AMEND­
MENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE:  A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 183 (1992). 
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2. History of Anonymous Jury Jurisprudence 
a. The Barnes-Paccione line of cases lays the groundwork 
The first anonymous jury in American history was empaneled 
in 1977.96 United States v. Barnes was an organized-crime trial in 
the Southern District of New York.97  Leroy “Nicky” Barnes was 
tried with fourteen codefendants on counts of conspiracy, violations 
of federal narcotics laws, and possession of weapons.98  One of the 
Government’s witnesses for the trial was Robert Geronimo.99 
Before the trial, the United States Marshals, who had custody of 
Geronimo, received a phone call during which the caller said, “[i]f 
he [Geronimo] does anything, he’ll be dead.”100  Right before the 
trial began, another alleged Barnes associate, Shepard Franklin, ac­
tually did turn up dead.101  The Government moved to sequester 
the jury for their safety.102  The trial judge went a step further and 
“prohibited the disclosure of the names, addresses, and religious 
and ethnic backgrounds of potential jurors.”103  In fact, neither the 
prosecutor nor defense counsel were able to learn what neighbor­
hood the jurors lived in; rather, they could only inquire as to a “ju­
ror’s county of residence.”104 
Two things are worth noting about the manner by which the 
anonymous empaneling played out.  First, neither of the parties re­
quested an anonymous jury; it was done, rather, as a “judicial 
fluke.”105  When counsel pressed the trial judge for an explanation, 
he responded, “I think jurors are entitled to their privacy and I 
think their families are entitled to their privacy.”106  Secondly, the 
trial judge stymied litigation of the issue at trial level.107  The U.S. 
Attorney said nothing when the trial judge announced the anony­
mous empaneling at a pretrial conference, and the judge rejected 
96. Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exi­
gent Circumstances Only, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 457, 457 (1999). 
97. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979); Abramovsky, supra note 
96, at 457, 460. R 
98. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 130; Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 460. R 
99. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 461. R 
100. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 461. R 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 458. 
106. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 168 (2d Cir. 1979). 
107. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 461. R 
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out of hand the defense’s numerous objections.108  And so, the 
court empaneled the first fully anonymous jury in the United States 
without the guidance of prior case law or the participation of the 
parties.109  Even so, the Second Circuit approved the trial judge’s 
decision, finding that “[t]here is neither statutory nor constitutional 
law that requires disclosure of information about jurors unrelated 
to any issue as to which prejudices may prevent an impartial 
verdict.”110 
After the Second Circuit’s decision in Barnes, anonymous ju­
ries were used mostly in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New 
York111 and primarily for organized-crime cases.112  But it did not 
take long for courts in other districts to get into the act,113 and the 
federal courts of appeals developed a stable set of rules to guide 
lower courts.114  These rules were articulated in their entirety for 
the first time in United States v. Paccione.115  An anonymous jury 
could be empaneled if (1) there is a compelling reason to believe 
that the jury needs protection from outside sources, and (2) reason­
able precautions are taken to protect the jury’s impartiality and the 
defendant’s fundamental rights.116  Within this framework, it is in 
the discretion of the trial judge whether or not to allow an anony­
mous jury.117  Compelling reasons, under the first heading, could 
include (1) the involvement of the defendant in organized crime; 
(2) the participation of the defendant in a group that has the ability 
to harm jurors; (3) past attempts by the defendant to interfere with 
the judicial process; (4) the degree of punishment the accused faces 
if convicted; and (5) extensive media coverage and exposure of the 
jurors to harassment by journalists.118 
108. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 169. 
109. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 461. R 
110. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 143. 
111. Abramovsky, supra note 96, at 458. R 
112. Id. at 464.  “Although the Second Circuit has held that ‘the invocation of the 
words “organized crime,” “mob,” or “mafia,” without something more, do not warrant 
use of an anonymous jury,’ the federal courts have in practice concluded that ‘some­
thing more’ is present in virtually every organized crime case.” Id.  (citations omitted). 
113. See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1992). 
114. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
227 
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Soon, the issue took hold in the states.  In Ohio, a court of 
appeals overturned a murder conviction because the Fairfield 
County Court of Common Pleas had empaneled an anonymous jury 
according to its regular rules of procedure.119  But the Ohio Su­
preme Court reversed on the ground that the use of an anonymous 
jury did not amount to structural error and did not violate a funda­
mental constitutional right.120 
In Minnesota, following a series of sensational trials for the 
murder of a police officer, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld 
the empaneling of anonymous juries in three of the defendants’ tri­
als.121  Following the lead of other state courts, the Minnesota Su­
preme Court used the federal courts’ two-prong test to determine 
that the empaneling was proper.122 
But not all state courts embraced the idea.  In the Massachu­
setts case of Commonwealth v. Angiulo, the Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled that a trial court empaneling an anonymous jury failed to fol­
low a Massachusetts statute,123 which provides, “A prisoner in­
dicted for a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, 
upon demand by him or his counsel upon the clerk, shall have a list 
of the jurors who have been returned . . . .”124  This failure 
amounted to plain error.125  The court explained that “[t]he em­
panelment of an anonymous jury triggers due process scrutiny be­
cause this practice is likely to taint the jurors’ opinion of the 
defendant, thereby burdening the presumption of innocence.”126 
Five years later, in Commonwealth v. Dupont, the Superior Court 
of Massachusetts granted a defendant a new trial after an improp­
erly empaneled anonymous jury convicted.127  While not foreclos­
119. State v. Hill, 737 N.E.2d 577, 581-83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000), rev’d, 749 N.E.2d 
274 (Ohio 2001). 
120. Hill, 749 N.E.2d at 281-82. 
121. See generally State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995); Jodene Jensen, 
Case Note, Constitutional Law: Minnesota’s First Anonymous Jury, 22 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 133 (1996). 
122. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 530-31; see also Major v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1120, 1127 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); 
State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 144 (Tenn. 2006). 
123. Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 174 (Mass. 1993). 
124. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 66 (2008); see also Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d at 168­
69.  There is a similar statute in the U.S. Code, 18 U.S.C. § 3432, which states, “A per­
son charged with treason or other capital offense shall . . . be furnished with a . . . list of 
the veniremen . . . stating the place of abode of each venireman . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3432 
(2006); see also Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d at 169 n.18 (citing § 3432). 
125. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d at 170. 
126. Id. at 171 (citation omitted). 
127. Commonwealth v. Dupont, 9 Mass. L. Rptr. 1, 17 (Super. Ct. 1998). 
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ing the possibility of anonymous juries in Massachusetts, the court 
concluded that there had been “no good reason” for empaneling 
one.128  Dupont posed no threat to juror safety, and neither the 
prosecution nor the charges in the indictments suggested any need 
to protect the jury from improper influence.129 
In sum, although the introduction of the procedure in the fed­
eral district courts was anomalous at the time, the circuit courts of 
appeals quickly formulated a set of clear standards by which lower 
courts could empanel anonymous juries without doing violence to a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.  To be sure, there was a considera­
ble amount of litigation on the matter over the next twenty years. 
But in most cases the lower courts followed the standards faithfully, 
and the circuit courts of appeals were satisfied with the results.130 
Such has been the case, in large part, in state courts as well.131 
When a legitimate need for an anonymous jury arose, the Barnes-
Paccione standards proved a practical and workable way to allow 
judges to protect jurors’ safety and integrity.  But then during the 
eighties the Supreme Court decided two cases that limited judges’ 
discretion under the aegis of Barnes-Paccione. 
b.	 The Press-Enterprise decisions consider anonymous juries 
from a First Amendment perspective 
Several years after the Barnes case was decided, a California 
Superior Court judge closed the voir dire examination of prospec­
tive jurors for a rape-murder trial.132  When Press-Enterprise Com­
pany moved for the proceedings to be opened, the trial judge 
permitted Press-Enterprise “to attend only the general voir dire,” 
128. Id. at 7. 
129. Id. at 11. 
130. See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1992). 
131. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that mere allegations that the defendant, a gang member and murder suspect, 
had harassed a witness were sufficient for court to conclude that jury needed protec­
tion); State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 144 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury by inferring that the nature of the 
defendant’s crime (the murder of a witness) was sufficient to warrant protecting the 
jury). But see State v. Hill, 749 N.E.2d 274, 281 (Ohio 2001) (recognizing Paccione 
standard but refusing to find that failure to meet it amounts to structural error); Nancy 
J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Crimi­
nal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 131-32 (1996) (citing temporary policies of routine 
empanelment of anonymous juries in Los Angeles and Riverside Counties, California). 
132. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984). 
229 
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which amounted to a mere three days out of the six weeks of voir 
dire proceedings.133  The remaining six weeks of voir dire were con­
ducted behind closed doors.134  Following voir dire, Press-Enter­
prise moved to have the trial court release the complete transcript 
of the proceeding.  Counsel on both sides argued against the release 
of the transcript, stating that the release would be a violation of the 
jurors’ right of privacy.135  The trial judge agreed.136  Press-Enter­
prise again sought release of the transcript after the accused had 
been convicted and sentenced to death, and the judge again denied 
access, citing the jurors’ right to privacy.137 
But the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling.138  Af­
ter reviewing the history of the jury in both England and Colonial 
America, Chief Justice Burger concluded that “[p]ublic jury selec­
tion . . . was the common practice in America when the Constitu­
tion was adopted.”139  He went on to draw a distinction (which he 
admitted was hardly necessary) between the “right” to openness 
that attaches as between the defendant and the public and openness 
“as a component inherent in the system benefitting both.”140  He 
loosely characterized this openness as “the right of everyone in the 
community.”141 
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually 
attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are 
being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend 
gives assurance that established procedures are being followed 
and that deviations will become known.  Openness thus enhances 
both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of 
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.142 
Because of this essential quality of the jury system, the Court stated 
that 
[t]he circumstances under which the press and public can be 
barred from a criminal trial are limited . . . . Where . . . the State 
attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclo­
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 504. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 505. 
139. Id. at 508. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
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sure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is 
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is nar­
rowly tailored to serve that interest.143 
The openness of which Chief Justice Burger spoke does not 
amount merely to competing or overlapping rights between the ac­
cused and the public.  Chief Justice Burger took considerable 
trouble to explain the inherent functional value of openness to the 
system because it ensures that citizens can be, in a general sense, 
confident both in their system of justice and in the accused’s access 
to due process.144  “[O]penness has,” he explained, a “community 
therapeutic value” insofar as it serves “a community urge to retali­
ate and desire to have justice done.”145  More importantly, “public 
proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the commu­
nity in knowing that offenders are being brought to account for 
their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected.”146 
Openness is a quality so inherent to the proceedings that its ab­
sence invokes the strictest level of judicial scrutiny: “Closed pro­
ceedings . . . must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs 
the value of openness.”147 
Chief Justice Burger emphasized this inherent quality of open­
ness at trial and its value to the defendant even more explicitly in 
Press-Enterprise II.148  In that case, the trial court restricted the 
press’s access to the preliminary hearing of a murder trial.149  The 
State and Press-Enterprise moved for the release of the preliminary 
hearing’s transcript, and the defendant, a nurse charged with the 
murder of twelve hospital patients, opposed its release on the 
ground that it “would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity.”150 
Writing again for the Court, Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed Press-
Enterprise I and again emphasized that criminal proceedings are 
presumptively open.151  He noted, in even stronger terms than 
those of Press-Enterprise I, that “[t]he right to an open public trial 
is a shared right of the accused and the public, the common concern 
143. Id. at 509-10 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 
606-07 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
144. Id. at 508. 
145. Id. at 508-09. 
146. Id. at 509 (emphasis added). 
147. Id. 
148. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
149. Id. at 5. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 8. 
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being the assurance of fairness.”152  Further, he asserted that “the 
explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective 
of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the 
press and public.”153  So fundamental is the right of both accused 
and public to an open trial that the “risk of prejudice does not auto­
matically justify refusing public access to hearings on every motion 
[by the accused] to suppress” and “any limitation must be ‘narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.’”154  The public nature of the trial 
cannot be easily foreclosed even when doing so is in the interest of 
the accused. 
The Press Enterprise cases, although dealing primarily with the 
First Amendment right of the press to information concerning trial 
procedures, are significant when considered alongside the Barnes-
Paccione jurisprudence because the Press-Enterprise cases demon­
strate that there are two very different ways of litigating claims to 
the inherent rights of the public and the accused to an open trial.155 
Although the Press-Enterprise cases have developed independently 
from the Barnes-Paccione line of cases, the former demonstrate the 
contours of First and Sixth Amendment rights as between defen­
dant, jury, and public.156  The particulars of State v. Ross suggest 
that courts must have a clear perception of these contours before 
empaneling an anonymous jury under the Barnes-Paccione 
guidelines.157 
3. State v. Ross Revisited 
Trovon Ross appealed his murder conviction to the Utah Su­
preme Court in 2007, arguing that the trial court committed plain 
error by empaneling an anonymous jury.158  The court disagreed, 
holding that “[j]udges properly enjoy considerable latitude in con­
ducting the affairs of their courtroom so long as courtroom proce­
dures do not communicate bias against the defendant.”159  The 
court found that the lower court had “adhered closely to the princi­
152. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
153. Id. (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
154. Id. at 15 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). 
155. See generally Babak A. Rastgoufard, Pay Attention to That Green Curtain: 
Anonymity and the Courts, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1009, 1012-14 (2003). 
156. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508-09; see 
Rastgoufard, supra note 155, at 1014. R 
157. State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628, 637 (Utah 2007). 
158. Id. at 636. 
159. Id. at 637. 
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ples reflected in [the] guidelines [of the Barnes-Paccione stan­
dard].”160  The court further found that the lower court was justified 
in its finding because Ross’s crime “featured an embittered ex-
lover, a gruesome killing, a suspenseful escape, a police chase, and 
an abundance of other elements that made the trial an irresistible 
media event.”161  But nothing in the record demonstrates that the 
jurors’ privacy or safety was ever actually in peril.162 
The result in Ross brings up the question of whether the trial 
court’s empaneling of an anonymous jury went too far.  The 
Barnes-Paccione standards developed as guidelines for trial judges 
to use with the exercise of discretion for the purpose of controlling 
their courtrooms.163  The standards were formulated to protect the 
rights of the accused and the integrity of the jury system in the face 
of extreme circumstances, when the proceedings or the jurors them­
selves had been threatened with either violence or corruption.164 
But the Ross court did not use the Barnes-Paccione guidelines to 
protect jury integrity in the face of an articulated threat; rather, it 
used them to ward off the speculative threat of a press frenzy.165  In 
focusing on the Barnes-Paccione guidelines and ignoring the lessons 
of the Press-Enterprise cases, the Ross court compromised the in­
tegrity of the jury and very likely violated the due process rights of 
Trovon Ross. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Scholarship Surrounding the Issue of Anonymous Juries 
1. The Extremes 
The scholarly response to the growing use of anonymous juries 
has been limited and extreme.166  Professors Abramovsky and Ed­
elstein and Professor King inhabit the issue’s polar regions.  Profes­
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. at 630-31, 637. 
163. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192-93 (2d Cir. 1991). 
164. See id. 
165. Ross, 174 P.3d at 637. 
166. See generally Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96 (outlining various rea- R 
sons anonymous juries violate the rights of the accused); King, supra note 131; Kory A. R 
Langhofer, Unaccountable at the Founding: The Originalist Case for Anonymous Juries, 
115 YALE L.J. 1823 (2006); Marc O. Litt, “Citizen-Soldiers” or Anonymous Justice: Rec­
onciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the 
Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371 (1992); 
Rastgoufard, supra note 155 (considering whether anonymity can coexist with the pre- R 
sumed openness of the court system). 
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sor King argues that the main evils of anonymity—impairment of a 
defendant’s presumption of innocence and right to an impartial 
jury—can be eliminated by making anonymity routine.167  Ano­
nymity’s advantages, according to King, include enhancing the reli­
ability of voir dire,168 improving the quality of the jury’s 
deliberations,169 protecting jurors from intimidation during trial,170 
and promoting jury service.171  Furthermore, King asserts that ju­
rors should not be held accountable for the verdicts they render, so 
that “enlist[ing] the individual consciences of jurors” need not go so 
far as to join jurors’ consciences to names.172 
Professors Abramovsky and Edelstein argue against ever em­
paneling an anonymous jury.173  Anonymity, their argument goes, 
not only fails to serve the purpose of protecting jurors from threats 
of danger and from corruption,174 it also impairs the presumption of 
innocence,175 threatens judicial integrity,176 and disrupts the ability 
of counsel to investigate jurors for bias.177  Further, anonymity rep­
resents an “[e]rosion of the ‘tradition of identified jurors,’” which 
reaches back to Colonial times.178 
In short, Professors Abramovsky and Edelstein question, in 
the broadest terms, whether or not anonymous juries should exist at 
all.  Conversely, the arguments of Professor King question why 
anonymous juries should not always exist in every circumstance. 
This general approach is worthwhile scholarship, but it is of little 
help at present.  Anonymous juries are a confirmed part of the 
American legal landscape at both the federal and state level.  But 
they remain the exception rather than the rule.  And judges that 
elect to empanel anonymous juries need more particular guidance 
when treading on the ground of exception. 
167. See King, supra note 131, at 145-47. R 
168. Id. at 136-37. 
169. Id. at 137. 
170. Id. at 138. 
171. Id. at 139. 
172. Id. at 140-41; see also Langhofer, supra note 166. R 
173. See generally Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96. R 
174. See id. at 466-67. 
175. Id. at 468-72. 
176. Id. at 472-76. 
177. Id. at 476-81. 
178. Id. at 481. 
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2. A Practical Approach to Anonymous Juries 
The purpose of this Note is not to dispute the arguments in 
favor of or against anonymous juries.  In some respects, time has 
dulled their edge anyway.  Anonymous juries empaneled under the 
Barnes-Paccione guidelines have a thirty-year history in American 
jurisprudence.179  The Supreme Court appears to be in no hurry to 
invalidate them.180  At the other end of the argument, courts’ resort 
to these guidelines suggests that we are no closer to the routine 
anonymity sought by Professor King than we were when she pro­
posed the idea twelve years ago.181 
In short, the Barnes-Paccione guidelines work.  Their legiti­
macy has been upheld again and again, by court after court.182 
They allow judges to protect the jury’s essential elements from de­
fendant misconduct and overzealous media activity, and, more im­
portantly, they are in accord with the essential factors articulated in 
Williams.183 
Judges ought, therefore, to approach the Barnes-Paccione 
guidelines with the Williams factors in mind.  If there is no threat of 
interference from defendant misconduct, or if the threat is only 
from the media (i.e., the fifth guideline), empaneling an anonymous 
jury is unwarranted, beyond the scope of the judge’s discretion, and 
an impairment of the essential elements of the jury.  The Ross court 
acted beyond the scope of discretion allowed by the Barnes-Pacc­
ione jurisprudence because it failed to consider the implications of 
these guidelines within the context of Sixth Amendment jurispru­
dence.  The particular calculus for applying the Barnes-Paccione 
guidelines becomes clear when considered within the Sixth Amend­
ment framework of Williams v. Florida.184 
B. The Significance of Williams v. Florida 
Recall that the question presented in Williams was, in the 
broadest sense, whether “every feature of the jury as it existed at 
common law—whether incidental or essential to that institution— 
179. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979). 
180. Id. at 458; Rastgoufard, supra note 155, at 1012. R 
181. King, supra note 131, at 124. R 
182. See, e.g., State v. Samonte, 928 P.2d 1, 14 (Haw. 1996); State v. Hill, 749 
N.E.2d 274, 281 (Ohio 2001); State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2007) (using a variation of the Barnes-Paccione guidelines); State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 
132, 144 (Tenn. 2006). 
183. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96-103 (1970). 
184. Id. 
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was necessarily included in the Constitution wherever that docu­
ment referred to a ‘jury.’”185  After considering the history of Arti­
cle III and the Sixth Amendment, Justice White concluded that 
“there is absolutely no indication in the ‘intent of the Framers’ of 
an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and common-law 
characteristics of the jury.”186 
But recall also that the Court’s decision in Williams does not 
strip away the common-law protections that go beyond the letter of 
Article III and the Sixth Amendment.187  There are, according to 
Justice White, two essential features of a jury: “the interposition 
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment 
of a group of laymen, and . . . the community participation and 
shared responsibility that results from [the jury’s] determination of 
guilt or innocence.”188  The first of these features is primarily legal, 
the other primarily cultural.  First, as a legal institution, the jury acts 
as a safeguard of individual rights.189  This function is “legal” in the 
sense that it corresponds with and extends the checks-and-balances 
structure of the federal system as created and secured by the 
United States Constitution.190  Secondly, the jury “provides a vital 
link between the law and the community.”191  This quality is harder 
to identify, but acceptance of this premise is an important part of 
American jurisprudence.192  A jury’s legitimacy rests upon “the 
community participation and shared responsibility that result[ ] 
from [its] determination of guilt or innocence.”193  The lesson to 
take from Williams is that a jury can be modified without constitu­
tional effect to the extent that the modification does not impair 
185. Id. at 91.  The immediate question in Williams was whether a jury of less 
than twelve impaired a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 86. 
186. Id. at 99. 
187. Id. at 100. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. (“The purpose of the jury trial . . . is to prevent oppression by the Gov­
ernment . . . .”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (“A right to jury trial 
is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”); 
ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
183 (1992). 
190. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. 
191. GARCIA, supra note 189, at 183; see also Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; DE TOC- R 
QUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 319 (“[T]he jury is above all a political institution; it must R 
be considered as one form of the sovereignty of the people; it has to be entirely rejected 
were the sovereignty of the people discarded; otherwise it should be made to harmonize 
with those other laws which establish sovereignty.”). 
192. See DE  TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 319 (“Laws are always unsteady R 
when unsupported by custom[,] which is the only tough and lasting power in a nation.”). 
193. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. 
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these two essential functions.  The Barnes-Paccione guidelines as­
sume these essential functions and recognize that legitimate threats 
to them warrant the extreme step of empaneling an anonymous 
jury. 
C. The Barnes-Paccione Guidelines in the Context of Williams 
Recall that, under the Barnes-Paccione guidelines, a court 
should not empanel an anonymous jury unless (1) there is a strong 
reason to believe that the jury needs protection, and (2) the court 
takes reasonable precautions to make sure that the defendant is not 
prejudiced by the anonymous empaneling.194  There is sufficient 
reason to protect the jury by this step when (1) the defendant has a 
connection to organized crime; (2) the defendant has the means and 
capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendant has attempted to inter­
fere with the judicial process in the past; (4) the defendant is facing 
a lengthy incarceration or heavy fine; and (5) there has been exten­
sive pre-trial publicity in the matter.195  This section will explore 
how the above guidelines correspond with the two essential ele­
ments of a jury identified by Justice White in Williams.196  Four of 
these five reasons identify how the Williams elements may be im­
paired either by the misconduct of the defendant or by the behavior 
of the press.197  A judge may resort to an anonymous jury only after 
the essential elements of the jury have been threatened or im­
paired.198  Juror anonymity is thus a last resort—rather than a cas­
ual option—taken to protect the jury from threats to its most 
inherent qualities. 
1. The Defendant’s Involvement with Organized Crime 
Recall that anonymous juries were most often used in organ­
ized crime trials in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New 
York.199  In 1964, fifteen years before Barnes, Judge Friendly re­
flected the judicial system’s frustration in dealing with organized 
crime when, after confirmed threats were made against jurors, he 
194. United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991). 
195. Id. at 1192-93. 
196. Williams, 399 U.S. at 78. 
197. The fourth guideline is of no significance to this discussion.  All of the cases 
in which an anonymous jury is at issue are serious cases with severe penalties. See 
United States v. Mohammed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285-86 (D.D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding 
that the possibility of a lengthy incarceration is alone insufficient to justify empaneling 
an anonymous jury). 
198. See Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192. 
199. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96, at 458. R 
\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE106.txt unknown Seq: 23  4-MAY-10 15:56 
2010] THE ANONYMOUS JURY IN AMERICA 237 
anticipated the need for anonymous juries in United States v. Bo­
relli.200  In spite of case law warning that the mere connection to an 
organized crime syndicate is not enough to empanel an anonymous 
jury,201 in practice, association with organized crime is all that is 
necessary for a judge to grant a request for anonymous 
empaneling.202 
But this practice is quite proper.  A defendant’s involvement 
with organized crime is at odds with the jury’s essential function of 
interposing the commonsense judgment of a group of lay people to 
protect the defendant from the power and resources of the govern­
ment.203  The Barnes-Paccione doctrine developed as a result of 
countless attempts by defendants to circumvent judicial process 
with the resources of organized crime.204  A defendant who uses 
such resources has, in effect, spurned the legal protection offered to 
her by the jury and by the other legal institutions society provides 
for the protection of its citizens.  While association with organized 
crime does not mean that a defendant loses all of her rights, it is 
legitimate for a judge to balance the propriety of empaneling a 
traditional public jury for the purpose of protecting the defendant’s 
due process rights with the need to protect the jury’s safety. 
2.	 The Defendant’s Participation in a Group with the 
Capacity to Harm Jurors 
Like the first guideline, this guideline assumes that the defen­
dant relies on a group or corporate entity that is antithetical to the 
protective organizations of the legal system and is willing to corrupt 
those institutions by threat or force.  The second guideline is identi­
cal to the first in its recognition of the need to secure the jury’s 
function as a protective corporate barrier between government and 
defendant from conduct by the defendant or her associates that re­
gards the jury’s protective function with contempt.205  But this 
guideline also assumes that the defendant has put herself more ex­
plicitly at odds with the second Williams element, namely, the jury’s 
role as a communal institution of participatory democracy.206  The 
200. 336 F.2d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 1964); Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96, at R 
463. 
201. United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1991). 
202. Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 96, at 464; see also United States v. R 
Gambino, 809 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
203. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 96-118. R 
205. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. 
206. Id. 
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jury’s verdict is a legitimate exercise of power because of its “re­
publican character,” which “entrusts the actual control of society 
into the hands of the ruled, or some of them, rather than into those 
of the rulers.”207  A defendant’s involvement with a group that has 
the capacity to harm jurors mocks the very element that makes the 
jury a legitimate exercise of power.  An institution designed to pro­
tect citizens from public tyranny ought not to suffer an attack from 
private tyranny.  This guideline is, then, also a legitimate considera­
tion for a court because a defendant who endangers this particular 
quality of the jury’s essence relinquishes some claim to the protec­
tion that the quality secures. 
3.	 The Defendant’s Attempts to Interfere with Judicial 
Process or Witnesses 
Like the first two guidelines, this requirement responds to con­
duct by the defendant that is out of joint with the basic premises 
upon which the Williams guidelines are based.  The first Williams 
element assumes “[t]he insolence of office.”208  A jury would not be 
necessary as an interposition between government and accused un­
less the accused needed protection from the government, even the 
arm of the government that is responsible for administering justice. 
Therefore, a defendant who attempts to interfere with judicial pro­
cess by way of corrupting witnesses or jurors is essentially colluding 
with the very system that the jury is supposed to guard against. 
This third guideline allows for a judicial response to protect the in­
tegrity of the jury from such collusion when the defendant has 
demonstrated contempt or disregard for the organs of justice that 
shield her from the corruption of the government. 
4.	 The Potential for Lengthy Incarceration or Heavy Fine 
This guideline has little (if anything) to do with the essential 
elements of the jury.  Furthermore, it could never stand by itself as 
a reason to empanel an anonymous jury.  Its presence among the 
five guidelines is important only insofar as it ensures that the crime 
involved is of sufficient severity to warrant the extreme step of 
anonymity.209 
207. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 318. R 
208. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1. 
209. See supra note 197. R 
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5.	 Extensive Media Attention That Would Expose Jurors to 
Harassment or Intimidation 
Before considering the fifth guideline, two comments are in or­
der on the first four.  First, the circumstances anticipated by these 
guidelines clearly reflect the Barnes-Paccione doctrine’s organized-
crime heritage.210  In some respects, these guidelines represent the 
very heart of the doctrine, for they respond most directly to the 
disruptive circumstances faced by jurors in those early cases.211 
Secondly, the circumstances anticipated by the first four guidelines 
are all more or less things within the defendant’s control.  In this 
respect, the first four guidelines put the defendant on a sort of no­
tice.  If she involves herself with organized crime or attempts to cor­
rupt justice, she may end up facing an anonymous jury. 
The circumstances anticipated by the fifth guideline clearly im­
plicate both of Williams’s essential elements.  A press frenzy carries 
with it the risk of disrupting the commonsense judgment of the ju­
rors,212 and it discourages citizens from serving on juries at all.213 
In this respect, therefore, this guideline reflects the doctrine’s at­
tempt to protect the jury’s most essential qualities. 
But the fifth guideline is quite distinct from the other four. 
Unlike the others, the threshold circumstances for the fifth guide­
line are almost always beyond the control of the defendant.  Since a 
defendant has little control over the behavior of the press, the “tit­
for-tat” rationale that grounds the other guidelines in the conduct 
of the defendant is entirely absent here.  Furthermore, unlike the 
novelty that attended the circumstances giving rise to the first four 
guidelines, the tension between the fair administration of justice 
and the chaos that often attends public trials has been long recog­
nized by the courts.214  Standing by itself, media chaos should not 
be a reason for departing from the norm.  To this end, the Ross case 
is significant because the only determinative factor that the court 
210. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979). 
211. See United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 1964). 
212. See King, supra note 131, at 137-38.	 R 
213. Id. at 126-30. 
214. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 
U.S. 501, 509-10 (1984); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547-54 (1976); Shep­
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-52 (1966); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373-76 
(1947). 
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cited in empaneling the anonymous jury was speculation about a 
media frenzy.215 
D. The Ross Case 
As the Ross court points out, judicial discretion is a hallmark 
of anonymous jury jurisprudence.216  “Judges properly enjoy con­
siderable latitude in conducting the affairs of their courtroom so 
long as courtroom procedures do not communicate bias against the 
defendant.”217  But most courts, recognizing this discretion, also 
note that the decision to empanel an anonymous jury is “an ex­
treme measure.”218  And the decision usually attends extraordinary 
circumstances such as gang-related violence or offenses against jus­
tice implicated in the first four guidelines.219 
But in Ross there were no such extraordinary circumstances.220 
Although Ross carried off his crime in a sensational way, neither 
the crime nor anything in the record suggested that Ross himself 
was any more of a danger to the jury’s safety than any other angry 
ex-lover settling a score.221  The trial court’s decision to allow the 
empaneling of an anonymous jury rested entirely on “the threat of 
extensive publicity about the case” and a “desire to protect the ju­
rors’ privacy.”222 
The Utah court’s rationale is particularly troublesome when 
considered under the light of the Press-Enterprise line of cases. 
While Press-Enterprise does not set the standard that ought to be 
215. State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628, 637 (Utah 2007). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Major v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1120, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see, e.g., State v. 
Brown, 118 P.3d 1273, 1281 (Kan. 2005) (referring to the withholding of jurors’ names 
as “unusual”); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 171 (Mass. 1993) (“The due 
process clause precludes the empanelment of an anonymous jury at a criminal trial 
unless anonymity is necessary to protect the jurors from harm or improper influence.”); 
State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 387 (Minn. 2007) (stressing that an anonymous jury 
should only be empaneled in “rare and exceptional circumstances”). 
219. See, e.g., Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 386 (holding that the court properly em­
paneled an anonymous jury because the offense involved gang membership and retalia­
tory shooting); State v. Ferguson, 729 N.W.2d 604, 611-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) 
(finding anonymous empanelment proper because there was “strong reason . . . to be­
lieve the jury needed protection from external threats” from gang members); State v. 
Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132, 144-45 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that the trial court properly em­
paneled an anonymous jury on the ground that the defendant had committed murder to 
prevent the victim from going to the police). 
220. See State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628, 630-31, 637 (Utah 2007). 
221. See id. 
222. Id. at 637. 
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followed when empaneling an anonymous jury,223 it does articulate 
the contours of the constitutional rights involved as between juror 
and defendant so that the essential elements of the jury, as defined 
in Williams, are preserved. 
The Press-Enterprise line of cases makes clear that, with re­
spect to any “‘right’ to openness as between the accused and the 
public,” a distinction “is not crucial,”224 and “the [r]ight to an open 
public trial is a shared right of the accused and the public, the com­
mon concern being the assurance of fairness.”225  Most notably, 
Press-Enterprise II asserts that the Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial “is no less protective of the open nature of the trial than 
the First Amendment right of the press and public.”226 
When there is a media frenzy of such degree that a juror’s right 
to privacy is violated, the Press-Enterprise doctrine does not con­
sider the media’s conduct such a threat to or betrayal of process 
that it warrants restricting the presumed openness of the trial on 
the strength of the judge’s discretion alone.227  Rather, when media 
scrutiny invades a juror’s right of privacy, Press-Enterprise I re­
quires the judge to “seal only such parts of the transcript as neces­
sary to preserve the anonymity of the individuals sought to be 
protected.”228  But the purpose of sealing the transcript on such oc­
casions would be to protect a particular juror from embarrassment 
when answering voir dire questions rather than to protect every ju­
ror from the general inconvenience of media scrutiny.229  Under 
this line of cases, “[t]he presumption of openness [in judicial pro­
ceedings] may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on 
findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”230  If there is a juror pri­
vacy interest at issue, the burden falls on the juror to show, for ex­
ample, that voir dire questions pose a unique encroachment upon 
that interest.231 
223. But see Rastgoufard, supra note 155, at 1018-20. R 
224. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (“No right ranks higher than the 
right of the accused to a fair trial.  But the primacy of the accused’s right is difficult to 
separate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which 
promotes fairness.”). 
225. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986). 
226. Id. (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)); see also Rastgoufard, 
supra note 155, at 1013-14. R 
227. See generally Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501. 
228. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513. 
229. See id. at 512. 
230. Id. at 510. 
231. Id. at 512. 
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It is significant that the Press-Enterprise I Court put such rigid 
restrictions on a trial judge’s ability to close proceedings.  The re­
quirement that any such closure be narrowly tailored to protect the 
privacy of a particular juror reflects the Court’s reluctance to allow 
broad, across-the-board closures.  By keeping most of the proce­
dures open, the Court maintains the jury as an institution that al­
lows the open participation of the community in the judicial 
process.  In other words, it maintains the jury according to the es­
sential elements set out in Williams.232 
The Press-Enterprise cases thus have a very significant effect 
on the Barnes-Paccione doctrine when it comes to a case like Ross. 
Press-Enterprise teaches that the Sixth Amendment right to a “pub­
lic trial, by an impartial jury”233 is no less important than the First 
Amendment right the Court sought to protect by requiring trial 
judges to narrowly tailor their restrictions on access to jurors.234  If 
the object of the Barnes-Paccione guidelines is to secure the essen­
tial elements of the jury; and if the specific object of the fifth guide­
line is to prevent the media from impairing either of the Williams 
elements; that object, when the fifth guideline is the only guideline 
in play, must be subject to a standard similar to that of Press-Enter­
prise.  In a case like Ross, therefore, where the defendant was not 
associated with organized crime, did not have the capacity to harm 
jurors, and had no history of interfering with judicial process, the 
jury was no more vulnerable than it would have been in any other 
case in which there was intense media scrutiny.  In such a case, the 
trial judge ought not to have the discretion to empanel an anony­
mous jury (or close any aspect of the trial) unless something more is 
present. 
CONCLUSION 
The most important legal consideration of this Note is the in­
consistency between the Barnes-Paccione jurisprudence and the 
Press-Enterprise jurisprudence in addressing juror anonymity.  In 
strictly legal terms, this inconsistency ought to be rectified, or at 
least more fully explained by the courts. 
232. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
233. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
234. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (requiring “specific, on the 
record findings . . . demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values and 
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest’” (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 
510)); see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 501. 
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In terms of cultural considerations, the idea that media corpo­
rations, with the vast resources that attend such enterprises, should 
have additional advantages and a stronger claim on the presump­
tion of openness than the accused, who is frequently disadvantaged 
in terms of resources, friends, sympathy, and even (perhaps because 
of the vastness of the media corporations’ resources) the very pre­
sumption of innocence that our Constitution demands, seems pre­
posterous but not surprising. 
For this reason and others legal professionals must preserve 
the institutions of their trade.  This is not to say that these institu­
tions should not evolve and progress.  Preserving institutions does 
not mean bunkering them so that they no longer serve their pur­
pose.  But it does mean establishing contours of identity that are 
more or less rigid, especially in the face of the worst vices of mod­
ern existence—apathy, timidity, and intellectual and ethical sloth. 
The arguments in this Note therefore assume that it is not 
enough to say that a jury is successful if it completes its task and 
reaches an appropriate verdict.  “[T]he community participation 
and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determina­
tion of guilt or innocence”235 must also be present.  The jury not 
only comes to a decision, it also ratifies the work of the members of 
the bar who tried the case and the judge who heard it, of the elected 
officials who passed the substantive laws at issue and the governing 
procedural rules, and of the centuries of public servants and advo­
cates who have eked out the rule of law by increments and scraps 
from the grip of tyranny and arrogance.  Casually turning such a 
decision over to mere “consciences”236 operating from hidden iden­
tities betrays this communal responsibility. 
Brian Clifford* 
235. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. 
236. King, supra note 131, at 141. R 
* I dedicate this Note to my parents. 
